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Few researchers focus on how share class structures affect corporate decisions, 
particularly asset transactions. With a hand-collected sample of 1632 asset transactions by TSX- 
and TSX-V-listed purchasers, we first test whether the relative transaction values differ for 
single- and dual-class buyers, and then examine how the degree of dual class structures 
influences the relative transaction values with a subsample of 82 transactions involving only 
dual-class buyers. We also explore whether the relative value of asset purchases depends on three 
characteristics of dual-class purchasers. Our empirical evidence shows that the relative 
transaction value for a dual-class purchaser is significantly larger only when a subsample of 
family-controlled buyers is used, and that a higher degree of dual class structure corresponds to a 
larger relative transaction value. We find that the relative transaction values for family-controlled, 
dual-class purchasers are greater than those for nonfamily-controlled ones, that a higher family 
ownership leads to a bigger relative transaction value, and that the relative value for dual-class 
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Only a small number of previous studies mention the relation between corporate share 
class structures and asset transactions, and the majority of these studies, such as DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo (1985) and Bethel, Liebeskind, and Opler (1998), just qualitatively explore the area. 
Moreover, even fewer researchers focus on this relation in the Canadian market. Thus, this study 
fills these gaps in the literature by constructing a quantitative and empirical analysis using 
Canadian data. 
In order to demonstrate the effect of share class structures on asset transactions, we firstly 
examine the values of transactions for single- and dual-class purchasers. We use the relative 
values of transactions, which are obtained by dividing the Canadian dollar values of the 
transactions by the total assets of the purchasers, as the dependent variable, and employ a binary 
variable (ClassDummy) which distinguishes dual-class firms from single-class ones and an index 
(DualClassDegree) which represents the degree of dual class structure as the two main 
explanatory variables. 
Furthermore, inspired by the findings of DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) and McVey, 
Draho, and Stanley (2005) that family involvement is common among dual-class firms, we 
explore the relation between relative transaction values and family involvement for dual-class 
purchasers. Herein three variables, including family ownership (FamilyOwnership) and two 
dummy variables (FamilyDummy and DirectorDummy) which respectively indicate whether the 
purchaser is family-controlled and whether it has more than one family member as a director on 
its board, are used as the major independent variables. 
Firm-level control variables include the purchaser’s transaction history, ROA, EPS, stock 
return, and leverage. Competition in the industry and industry leverage are considered as 
industry-level controls, and GDP growth rate is included to control for macroeconomic effects. 
Using SDC Platinum, Factiva, SEDAR, and WRDS, we build a full sample of 1,632 asset 
transactions with TSX- or TSX Venture-listed purchasers, and a subsample of 82 transactions 
involving dual-class buyers. 
In the first part of the thesis, we utilize the full sample to test whether the relative 
transaction values differ for single- and dual-class purchasers. We find that the estimated 
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coefficients of the variable ClassDummy are statistically insignificant at conventional levels. To 
examine the possible influence of family involvement, we create four subsamples based on 
whether purchasers are family-controlled or not and whether the threshold used to identify 
family-controlled firms is 5% or 10%. We find that all the estimated coefficients for the variable 
ClassDummy are significantly positive using the subsample of family-controlled buyers when 
either threshold is employed, which suggests that the relative transaction value for a family-
controlled, dual-class purchaser is larger than that for a family-controlled, single-class purchaser. 
This relation does not hold for the subsample of nonfamily-controlled buyers. Thus, the absence 
of a relation between the relative value of transactions and whether the buyer is single- or dual-
class in the full sample may be attributed to the much larger sample size for nonfamily-controlled 
versus family-controlled purchasers. The above results demonstrate that dual class structures are 
useful for families to exert their control on corporate decision making, such as asset purchases. 
In examining how the degree of dual class structures affects the relative transaction values, 
we use the subsample of 82 transactions and find that all the estimated coefficients of 
DualClassDegree are significantly positive after dealing with the problem of using the particular 
index as a proxy of the degree of dual class structure. This means that a higher degree of dual 
class structure leads to a larger relative transactions value. 
We also employ this subsample to test whether the relative value of asset purchases 
depends upon whether the dual-class buyer is family-controlled, the value of family ownership, 
and whether the dual-class buyer has two or more family-related directors. The results show that 
all the estimated coefficients of FamilyDummy and FamilyOwnership are significantly positive, 
while those of DirectorDummy are always negative. From these results, we can conclude that the 
relative value of transactions for family-controlled dual-class purchasers is greater than that for 
nonfamily-controlled ones, that a higher family ownership contributes to a bigger relative 
transaction value, and that the relative value for dual-class purchasers who have more than one 
family members on the board is smaller. 
The remainder of the thesis proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature. 
Sections 3, 4, and 5 describe our sample, variables, and data, respectively. Section 6 discusses the 
regression frameworks used to examine the relative values of transactions for single- and dual-
class buyers, and presents and discusses the results. Section 7 further examines the relation 
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between relative values and family involvement for dual-class buyers. Section 8 concludes the 
thesis. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Previous studies dealing with dual-class firms 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) define dual classes of common stock as those with 
identical cash flows, but different per-share voting rights. Yiu, Lu, Bruton, and Hoskisson (2007) 
hold that dual classes of stock have both a cash flow and a control dimension. Ben-Nasr, 
Boubakri, and Cosset (2012) state that, like pyramids, cross-holdings, and multiple control chains, 
dual-class stock is an ownership leveraging device. While pyramids are more common 
throughout the world than dual-class shares (La Porta et al., 1999), dual-class firms are frequent 
in Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Korea, Mexico, Sweden, and 
Switzerland. A smaller proportion of listed firms have a dual-class structure in Australia, Chile, 
France, Hong-Kong, South Africa, the U.K., and the U.S. (Nenova, 2003). To illustrate, Faccio 
and Lang (2002) report that dual-class shares are employed by 66%, 51%, and 41% of the firms 
in Sweden, Switzerland, and Italy, respectively. 
In a typical dual-class firms, owners hold a minority (majority) interest in the cash flows 
(voting) rights associated with the common shares (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985; Bebchuk and 
Weisbach, 2010; McGuire, Wang, and Wilson, 2014). This finding is consistent with the 
conclusion of Yurtoglu (2003) that the use of dual-class stock arrangements can result in majority 
control through a relatively small direct investment by the core owner elite. Nenova (2003) 
asserts that dual-class firms report significant control premiums, which indicates that dual-class 
ownership structures protect private control benefits (Smart and Zutter, 2003). Doidge (2004) and 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) also demonstrate that private benefits are higher in firms with 
dual-class shares compared to firms with a one share-one vote rule. Thus, control can be 
enhanced with mechanisms such as dual-class shares and pyramids (Lins, 2003). Thus, the 
empirical evidence supports the conjecture that control rights often exceed that indicated by 
ownership through the use of governance mechanisms such as pyramid ownership structures, 
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cross-holdings, and the presence of dual-class shares (Lubatkin, Ling, and Schulze, 2007; 
Giannetti and Laeven, 2009). 
However, Faccio and Lang (2002) argue that dual-class shares and pyramids only enhance 
the control of the largest shareholders, and Stulz (2005) claims that the dominant owners are able 
to take advantage of these mechanisms to secure control of a large number of corporations. 
Hoskisson et al. (2005) also report that large owners extract the benefits of control at the expense 
of minority owners through the use of dual-class equity. This divergence between control and 
ownership is a manifestation of the agency conflict between controlling and minority 
shareholders (Villalonga and Amit, 2009; King and Segal, 2009; Aguilera and Jackson, 2010). 
Amoako-Adu, Baulkaran, and Smith (2011) also treat the greater transfer of wealth from outside 
shareholders to controlling shareholders as a reflection of the bigger agency problems and costs 
associated with dual class structures. 
A number of previous studies account for the existence of dual-class stock in their 
empirical work. Most of this research employs a dummy variable which equals one if a firm 
utilizes dual-class shares with differential voting rights, and zero otherwise.
1
 McGuire, Wang, 
and Wilson (2014) also use the difference between the voting rights and cash flow rights of 
insiders, and Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2009) also include the ratio of voting rights of insiders 
over their cash flow rights. Francis, Schipper, and Vincent (2005) define the superior class as the 
common stock with the larger voting rights per share, and create variables including superior 
voting rights per share and inferior voting rights per share. 
Dual-class structures are associated with particular shareholders and employees. 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) observe substantial family involvement in many dual-class 
firms, and McVey, Draho, and Stanley (2005) report that a dual-class structure is more prevalent 
among family-controlled firms. Dual-class shares provide the founder or heir with additional 
means to pursue their goals (La Porta et al., 1999; Anderson, Duru, and Reeb, 2009; Srinidhi, He, 
and Firth, 2014). On the other hand, Ruback (1988) shows that dual-class exchange offers can 
induce outside shareholders to exchange their shares for limited voting shares. However, Masulis, 
Wang, and Xie (2009) hold that corporate cash holdings are worth less to outside shareholders for 
                                                             
1 This includes Smart and Zutter (2003), Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan (2007), Smart, Thirumalai, and Zutter (2008), 
Zhao and Chen (2008), King and Segal ( 2009), Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick ( 2010), Masulis, Pham, and Zein 
( 2011), Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao (2012), Ryngaert and Thomas (2012), Larcker, So, and Wang (2013), Knyazeva, 
Knyazeva, and Masulis (2013) and McGuire, Wang, and Wilson (2014). 
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dual-class companies with a wider divergence between insider voting and cash flow rights. 
Furthermore, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) find that managers of dual-class firms may be 
more likely to retain voting control when it is costly for them to provide external shareholders 
with information. Partch (1987) claims that common stocks with limited voting rights change 
managerial incentives. Some types of CEO turnover are less frequent for dual share class 
structures (Smart, Thirumalai, and Zutter, 2008). Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2009) demonstrate 
that as the divergence between insider voting and cash flow rights widens, CEOs receive higher 
compensation and managers make shareholder value-destroying acquisitions more often. This 
suggests that dual-class ownership entrenches managers and allows them to perform at a 
suboptimal level (McGuire, Wang, and Wilson, 2014). 
Firm performance can be influenced by a dual-class ownership structure. Jarrell and 
Poulsen (1988) report significant, negative abnormal stock price returns at the announcement of 
the dual-class recapitalization. McVey, Droho, and Stanley (2005) and Niu (2008) think that this 
structure is associated with weaker corporate governance. Wang (2006) finds that earnings of 
firms with dual-class equity structures are less informative than those of firms with single-class 
equity structures. The findings of Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan (2007) suggest that family firms 
without dual-class shares, rather than family firms with dual-class shares, are primarily 
responsible for family firms exhibiting better disclosure practices and better disclosure-related 
consequences as compared to non-family firms. Smart, Thirumalai, and Zutter (2008) find that 
dual-class firms trade at lower prices than do single-class firms, and that when duals unify their 
share classes there are statistically and economically significant value gains. Villalonga and Amit 
(2009), Masulis, Pham, and Zein (2011) and McGuire, Wang, and Wilson (2014) report a 
negative impact of dual-class stock on firm value. Similarly, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010) 
provide evidence that firm value is increasing (decreasing) in the cash-flow (voting) rights of 
insiders. In contrast, Francis, Schipper, and Vincent (2005) argue that the net effect of dual-class 
structures is to reduce the credibility of earnings and enhance the salience of dividends as 
measures of performance. Srinidhi, He, and Firth (2014) propose that a family which has greater 
voting rights through dual-class shares, has greater incentives to increase firm value. Canadian 
firms with dual-class shares are valued at a discount to widely held firms while cross-listed firms 
with dual-class shares exhibit a permanent increase in valuation (King and Segal, 2009). 
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Kryzanowski and Zhang (1992) find no anomalous abnormal returns or beta nonstationarity 
associated with the ex-dates for dual-class-creating stock splits. 
 
2.2 Previous studies dealing with asset transactions 
The central prediction of the model of Hege, Lovo, and Slovin (2009) is that there are 
large gains in wealth for both buyers and sellers in equity-based asset sales. Warusawitharana 
(2008) reports that purchases and sales of operating assets by firms generated $162 billion for 
shareholders over the past 20 years, and that corporate asset purchases and sales are consistent 
with efficient investment decisions. 
The previous literature reports various incentives to buy assets. King (2007) provides 
evidence that firms attempt to prevent certain threats such as strategic maneuvering and 
postcontractual opportunism by buying certain firm assets. For instance, the Conservation Fund 
prevented the threat of strategic maneuvering in the future by acquiring the development use 
rights from International Paper (Coccia, 2004). Managers buy assets due to profit and 
reputational incentives (Dasgupta, Prat, and Verardo, 2011). Demski, Lin, and Sappington (2008) 
argue that voluntary certification, which permits the owner of a high-value asset to sell the asset 
at a price that reflects its true (high) value rather than at a (lower) price that reflects the expected 
value of all uncertified assets, provides useful information to asset buyers. 
Coval and Stafford (2007) report that the abnormal returns of stocks with asset purchases 
are positive, especially for acquirers of state-owned assets (Vayanos and Woolley, 2013; 
Borisova, John, and Salotti, 2013; Borisova and Cowan, 2014). Sengul and Gimeno (2013) find 
that a firm which either buys fixed assets or adds to the value of existing fixed assets incurs 
capital expenditures which are expected to create future benefits. Kurt and Hulland (2013) 
provide the example of a firm that builds new facilities and buys new machinery to increase its 
production capacity. Peterson, Kushwaha, and Kumar (2015) conjecture that firms with 
promotional focuses are likely to be interested in taking some financial risks that might lead to 
greater gains, such as taking out a loan to purchase an asset that might increase in value instead of 
merely saving the money in a low-interest savings account. 
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The forces in the acquisition market can potentially offset a buying firm’s abilities to 
exploit information disadvantages in the selling firm’s managers (Bergh, Johnson, and Dewitt, 
2008). Competition among buyers can result in a price run-up by inducing buyers to purchase 
assets at a loss to prevent competitors from purchasing at lower prices (Bond and Leitner, 2014). 
Firms typically purchase tangible assets more frequently than intangible assets (Teece, 
1998; Barth et al., 2001) with cash, shares, and hybrid deals as the modes of payment (Slovin, 
Sushka, and Polonchek, 2005; Brauer, Gallen, and Wiersema, 2012). Synthetic leases, which 
defer cash outflows in comparison to traditional leases, are an alternative way of financing asset 
purchases (Zechman, 2010). Asset purchases potentially have stock and flow effects where stock 
effects are persistent changes in prices that result from movements along demand curves for 
treasury securities of each maturity, and flow effects are the response of prices to the ongoing 
purchases (D’Amico and King, 2013). Due to any impairment of liquidity and functioning, flow 
effects may lead to sluggish price discovery. 
Some authors argue that firms may benefit from selling assets. Potential shareholder gains 
from asset sales include: the benefit from using the proceeds of sale to finance any remaining 
positive, but unfunded, NPV projects of the firm (Hite et al., 1987) to improve its bargaining 
position and/or reduce its dependence on external financing (Slovin et al., 2005; King, 2007; 
Hege, Lovo, Slovin, and Sushka, 2009; and House and Masatlioglu, 2015) or to purchase 
undervalued assets (He, 2009). If the sell-off process allows firms to optimally adjust their 
capacity and reallocate their assets to their most efficient and productive uses, then their market-
derived value would benefit (John and Ofek, 1995; Yang, 2008).  
Mulherin and Boone (2000) find a mean abnormal return of 2.60 percent for a sample of 
370 divestitures. Clayton and Reisel (2013) and Borisova, John, and Salotti (2013) report equity 
and debt excess returns associated with asset sales. Significant gains generated by cash sales 
typically accrue only to sellers (Hege, Lovo, and Slovin, 2009). While selling the assets to an 
independent owner generates a more competitive value for the asset, it also lowers the expected 
costs for future input supplies driven by additional upstream competition (De Fontenay and Gans, 
2008). Slovin et al. (2005) claim that a seller can convey information about the value of the 
relevant asset by divesting an operating asset for buyer equity. Bates (2005) asserts that asset 
sales rarely result in an immediate reduction in assets, but often substantially increase liquidity 
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for the divesting firm. This means that distressed firms can sell off relatively tangible and less 
productive assets to raise cash to stave off bankruptcy (Eckbo and Thorburn, 2008), and that 
borrowers can de-lever by paying off some or all of their existing debt to relax the extent of their 
credit rationing (Acharya and Viswanathan, 2011). 
Williamson (1988) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that firms, whose assets cannot 
be readily redeployed by firms outside of the industry, are likely to experience lower liquidation 
values or “fire-sale” discounts in cash auctions for asset sales, especially when its industry also is 
in financial distress (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). Coval and Stafford (2007) report negative 
abnormal returns for stocks predicted to face fire sales. Bergh, Johnson, and Dewitt (2008) and 
Greenwood, Landier, and Thesmar (2012) argue that it occurs because managers may be reluctant 
to sell potentially important assets to a rival when the specialized uses of certain types of assets 
create a thin resale market that reduces the number of potential buyers for an auction or sell-off. 
Cheung et al. (2009) demonstrate that the normal asset sales by Hong Kong firms to related 
parties are completed at unfavorable prices compared to similar deals at arm’s-length. Private 
firms that restructure via asset sales have significantly lower returns reflected by changes in 
operating cash flows (Guo, Hotchkiss, and Song, 2011). Due to the substantial taxes associated 
with asset sales, shareholders only gain the after-corporate-tax proceeds from the sale (Erickson 
and Wang, 2007). Cross-signaling can be a leading concern during asset sales when the agent 
possesses multidimensional private information (He, 2009). 
Asset purchases and sales may also benefit certain third parties. Yang (2008) notes that 
traders improve efficiency in the industry by moving resources from less to more productive 
firms. Calomiris, Fisman, and Wang (2010) report that the benefits to firms from increased 
privatization are contingent on government asset sales being accompanied by broader economic 
liberalization. Vig (2013) finds that secured creditors have the right to take over management of 
the secured assets or even the business itself and the secured creditors can sell off the secured 
assets to recover the obligations. 
Empirical studies take asset purchases or sales into account in various ways. Bergh, 
Johnson, and Dewitt (2008) create a dummy variable equal to 1 for spin-offs and 0 for sell-offs. 
Eckbo and Thorburn (2008) include the binary variable with a value of 1 if the report indicates 
significant pre-filing asset sales, and 0 otherwise. Brauer, Gallen, and Wiersema (2012) employ 
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three dummy variables to capture the payment mode; specifically, a cash deal dummy variable 
equal to 1 for cash payments and 0 otherwise, a share deal dummy variable equal to 1 for stock 
payments and 0 otherwise, and a hybrid deal dummy variable equal to 1 for both cash and stock 
payments and 0 otherwise. In contrast, Maksimovic and Philips (2001) and Yang (2008) define 
the rate of asset sales as the percentage of plants that change ownership in the industry. Guo, 
Hotchkiss, and Song (2011) create a variable to measure the level of asset sales which is the total 
value of asset sales during the 3-year period after completion of the buyout divided by post-
buyout capital. Ryngaert and Thomas (2012) use the dollar amount of the assets bought or sold 
directly. 
Asset transactions can be influenced by different factors. Dasgupta, Prat, and Verarado 
(2011) find that a manager of a buyer with a positive signal who trades after a sequence of buys is 
even more willing to buy the asset, even if it results in an overpayment. Caballero and Simsek 
(2013) hold that the aggregate amount of new purchases by banks depends on their demand for 
assets net of the supply of legacy assets.  
Sellers consider if the expected returns from reinvestment of the proceeds from asset sales 
exceed their required rates of return (Filatotchev and Toms, 2006). The timing of foreclosed asset 
sales is determined by current and expected levels of potential buyer wealth (Brown, Ciochetti, 
and Riddiough, 2006). Asset sales are higher in expansion years, and peak when the economy 
moves from recession to expansion (Yang, 2008). The liquidation price plays a crucial role in 
determining the extent of asset sales or de-levering (Acharya and Viswanathan, 2011). The 
likelihood of its asset sales increases with a firm’s bankruptcy (Benmelech and Bergman, 2011), 
and higher unexplained valuations in an industry (Maksimovic, Philips, and Yang, 2013) for both 
public and private firms. Asset sales are also driven by firm fundamentals and initial conditions 
(Maksimovic, Philips, and Yang, 2013). Return on assets and size strongly predict when firms 
purchase or sell assets (Warusawitharana, 2008; Li, Lundholm, and Minnis, 2013).  Firms with 
rising (falling) productivity buy (sell) assets and industries in which firms have less persistent and 
more volatile productivity experience greater asset reallocations (Yang, 2008). 
Most of the small number of studies that focus on the relationship between share class 
structures and asset transactions report that a dual class structure does affect corporate decisions 
concerning asset sales. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) find that managers may hold stock which 
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carries a reduced vote in board elections because such shares carry voting rights in other major 
corporate transactions such as mergers and asset sales. Bethel, Liebeskind, and Opler (1998) 
claim that adopting defensive mechanisms (including dual-class share structures and ESOPs) 
repel activist investors by diminishing the voting power of blockholders. In turn, this may prevent 
large investors from using proxy contests or otherwise exercising their voting power to pressure 
managers to change corporate policy or to enact strategic decisions such as asset divestitures. 
Hanson and Song (1996) find that managers with a strong preference for shares with 
superior voting rights make unrelated asset acquisitions to diversify their employment risk. Hu 
and Black (2007) argue that a dual-class common share structure can make it easier for firms to 
make long-term, positive NPV investments with unobservable payoffs. In contrast, Dimitrov and 
Jain (2006) find higher past growth rates in sales and assets for dual-class firms, consistent with 
the conclusion of Lauterbach and Yafeh (2011) that the asset growth rates of dual-class firms 
tend to be higher, on average, than single-class firms. 
 
3. Sample 
We begin by capturing all 7,553 asset transactions with TSX- or TSX Venture-listed 
purchasers from January 1, 2000 to July 13, 2015.
2
 After adding five additional transactions 
identified from a Factiva search and deleting transactions with blank transaction values, the initial 
sample is reduced to 5,262 asset transactions of which 3,002 have a completed deal status. 
Taking unusual features of financial firms into account, we delete transactions by these special 
asset purchasers. This reduces the sample to 2,338 transactions. Then we delete transactions with 
no values for total assets for the purchasers and those for which information concerning the 
buyer’s class structure or family participation is unavailable in SEDAR. We then search for 
values for various control variables for this sample in SDC Platinum, WRDS, World Bank Open 




                                                             
2 This is 4.45% of the 169,718 asset transactions included in SDC Platinum for this time period. 
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4.1 Dependent and independent variables 
The dependent variable examined herein is the relative value of asset transactions 
(AssetTranRatio), which is obtained by dividing the Canadian dollar value of the transaction by 
the purchaser’s total assets. 
Depending upon the hypothesis being tested, the major independent variable is either 
ClassDummy or DualClassDegree. The former is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the 
asset purchaser is dual-class and 0 if not. The latter is similar to that used by Masulis, Wang, and 
Xie (2009) and it reflects the degree of the dual class structure that is calculated as follows: 
                
                 
         
 
where A, B, C, and D denote the number of Class A, B, C, and D common shares respectively, 
and a, b, c, and d represent the number of voting rights for each Class A, B, C, and D common 
share. As we subsequently discuss below, this metric can provide counter-intuitive rankings if a 
share structure includes shares with no voting rights. 
Based on the findings of DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) and McVey, Draho, and 
Stanley (2005) that family involvement is prevalent among dual-class firms, we use three 
variables, FamilyDummy, FamilyOwnership, and DirectorDummy, to indicate family 
participation as shareholders and on the board of directors. FamilyDummy is a dummy variable 
which is equal to 1 if the purchaser is family-controlled and 0 otherwise. According to Muñoz-
Bullón and Sanchez-Bueno (2011), a firm whose family ownership exceeds a threshold can be 
considered as family-controlled, and 5% and 10% are used herein as the threshold. 
FamilyOwnership is the percentage of the total number of outstanding common shares held by 
family shareholders. DirectorDummy is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the buyer has 
two or more directors who are related family members on the board and 0 otherwise. 
 
4.2 Control variables 
We draw our control variables from those used in previous studies (e.g., Dagupta, Prat, 
and Verarado, 2011; Yang, 2008; and Warusawitharana, 2008). Sequence1 is a dummy variable 
which is equal to 1 if the purchaser traded after a sequence of buys in the sample period and 0 
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otherwise. Sequence2 is the number of buys in the same period before this particular transaction. 
ROA, EPS, and StockReturn are return on assets during the last 12 months, earnings per share 
during the last 12 months and the stock return from 4 weeks to 1 week prior to the asset purchase 
announcement. Leverage is the book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets at the 
end of the last 12 months to capture the purchaser’s ability to pay debt. We include three 
variables to control for industry-level effects. IndParticipant is the number of firms which belong 
to the same industry as the purchaser. IndConcentration is the value of the Herfindahl Index 
calculated based on the market share of the top five firms in the same industry as the purchaser to 
reflect industry concentration. This index is given by: 
                       
        
        
        
        
  
where       ,       ,       ,       , and        denote market share of each of the top 5 
firms, and market share of one particular firm is calculated as its sales divided by the sum of the 
sales of all firms in the same industry. IndLeverage is the average value of the leverage ratios of 
all firms in the same industry as the purchaser. GDPGrowth is included to control for 
macroeconomic effects. GDPGrowth is the percentage change of real GDP compared to that for 
the previous year for the country in which the headquarters of the purchaser are located. We 
employ 2-, 3-, and 4-digit SIC codes for all of the industry-level control variables. For instance, 
the variable IndParticipant2 is created using the 2-digit SIC code, and IndParticipant3 and 
IndParticipant4 are created using 3- and 4-digit SIC codes, respectively. The method is the same 
for variables IndConcentration and IndLeverage. 
 
5. Data 
5.1 Data sources 
A summary description of the data sources used herein is provided in Table 1. Value of 
the asset-purchase transactions and the total assets of the purchasers are obtained from SDC 
Platinum, and from Factiva when unavailable in SDC Platinum. Information about a firm’s class 
structure, including whether it is single- or dual-class, number of common shares in each class, 
and number of voting rights for each common share, are manually collected from the “Voting 
securities and principal holders of voting securities” section in the Proxy Circulars available on 
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the website, System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR). Information 
about family shareholders, their holdings and directorships are obtained manually from either the 
“Voting securities and principal holders of voting securities” or “Election of directors” section of 
the Proxy Circulars available at the SEDAR website. 
The variables, Sequence1 and Sequence2, are derived from the obtained sample and from 
examining the history of each firm. Values for other control variables, such as ROA, EPS, 
StockReturn, and Leverage, are obtained from SDC Platinum. Data on industry participants, 
industry concentration, and industry leverage is obtained from Compustat Monthly Updates 
available through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). GDP growth rates of various 
countries are obtained generally from World Bank Open Data. Exceptions include the 2015 rates 
for Canada and the U.S. which are the averages of Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) forecast, 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecast, and United Nations (UN) forecast; and 2009 GDP 
growth rate for Guernsey which comes from the Guernsey Economic Overview 2013. 
 
5.2 Summary statistics 
Table 2 presents three panels of descriptive information for our sample of firms. Panel A 
classifies transactions in both the full sample and the subsamples based on various criteria. Panels 
B and C report summary statistics (means, medians, standard deviations, and maximum and 
minimum values) for variables in the two samples separately. 
In Panel A for the full sample, 789 and 848 of the transactions are for purchasers listed 
respectively on the TSX and TSX Venture, 389 transactions involve buyers that are cross-listed 
in the U.S., and 644 transactions involve purchasers who traded before their particular 
transactions. For the subsample of 82 dual-class purchasers, the majority of transactions involve 
buyers who are listed in the TSX. Furthermore, 38 of these buyers are family-controlled, have 
more than one family-related director on their boards, and did not trade prior to the asset 
transactions. In addition, 96.34% of the dual-class purchasers are headquartered in Canada as are 
96.26% of the single-class buyers. 
Panel B reports that the mean relative transaction value is 0.7952 for all 1,632 
transactions, and that the mean number of previous transactions is 0.8817. Panel C reports on the 
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82 transactions in which only dual-class buyers participated. The variable AssetTranRatio has a 
mean value of 0.2411 with a maximum and minimum value of 5.3934 and 0.0005, respectively. 
The index reflecting the degree of dual class structure is 2.7130 on average. The percentage of 
the total number of outstanding common shares held by family shareholders is 13.06%. The 
average number of previous transactions is 1.6829, nearly twice as many as for the full sample. 
 
6. Examination of the relative values of transactions for single- and dual-
class purchasers 
In this section, we not only examine whether the relative value of asset purchases depends 
upon whether the purchaser is single- or dual-class, but also explore whether the degree of the 
dual class structure influences the relative transaction value. 
 
6.1 Methodology 
To test whether the relative value of asset purchases depends upon whether the purchaser 
is single- or dual-class, we examine the sign and significance of the  
 
 estimate from the 
following regression: 





                                           
                                                          
  
 
                               
 
(1) 
where all the variables are as previously defined (also see Table 1). 
Similarly, the effect of the degree of dual class structure on the relative value of 
transactions is reflected in the    estimate from the following regression: 
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(2) 
where the variable ClassDummy in model (1) is replaced by DualClassDegree, and all the other 
variables remain unchanged. 
 
6.2 Empirical results 
We first test whether the relative transaction values differ for single- and dual-class asset 
purchasers for the full sample of 1,632 asset transactions by estimating equation (1) for various 
combinations of firm-level, industry-level, and macro economy-level control variables. Based on 
the results summarized in Table 3, we observe that the estimated coefficients of our major 
independent variable ClassDummy are not statistically significant at conventional levels. In 
contrast, the estimated coefficients of many of the control variables such as ROA and Leverage 
are always significant. This result suggests that no significant differences exist in the relative 
transaction values of single- and dual-class purchasers. 
However, we cannot conclude that the relative values of the transactions are not 
significantly different for all types of single- and dual-class buyers because the relative 
transaction values may differ when we account for family involvement. To examine this 
possibility, we create four subsamples based on whether purchasers are family-controlled or not 
and whether the threshold used to identify family-controlled firms is 5% or 10%. Based on the 
results summarized in Panel A of Table 4 for the subsample of family-controlled buyers based on 
a 5% threshold, we find that all of the estimated coefficients for the variable ClassDummy are 
significantly positive and relative constant across the various formulations of equation (1). Thus, 
the relative transaction value for a family-controlled dual-class purchaser is significantly larger 
than that for a family-controlled single-class purchaser. Furthermore, the estimated coefficients of 
control variables such as IndLeverage4 and GDPGrowth are statistically significant in all the 
regressions, which implies that both industry leverage and GDP growth are negatively associated 
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with the relative value of asset transactions. More specifically in column (2), if industry leverage 
increases by one standard deviation, the relative transaction value will decrease by 0.333 standard 
deviation. The relationship between the relative values of asset purchases and the ClassDummy is 
robust to the threshold used to determine if the buyer is family controlled. The estimated 
coefficient using a 10% threshold that is reported in Panel B of Table 4 is consistently positive 
and significant. 
Regression results using a sample of nonfamily-controlled purchasers based on thresholds 
of 5% and 10% are reported in Panel C and D, respectively. In both panels, we find no significant 
relation between the dependent variable AssetTranRatio and our main explanatory variable 
ClassDummy. However, the control variable ROA continues to be always negatively related to the 
relative value of the transaction, and number of participants in the same industry is significantly 
and positively associated with AssetTranRatio. We surmise that the lack of a significant relation 
in the full sample between the relative value of a transaction and whether the buyer is single- or 
dual-class is probably due to the much larger sample size for nonfamily-controlled versus family-
controlled purchasers. 
These findings suggest that a dual class share structure is a more effective tool or 
mechanism for families to consolidate their power on corporate management, particularly in 
terms of growth through asset purchases. These findings not only support the findings that the 
dual class share structure affects corporate decisions dealing with asset transactions of DeAngelo 
and DeAngelo (1985), and Bethel, Liebeskind, and Opler (1998), but also are not inconsistent 
with the conjecture of Srinidhi, He, and Firth (2014) that a family with greater voting rights 
through holdings of dual-class shares has greater incentives to influence corporate management. 
We continue by examining the association between the degree of the dual class structure, 
DualClassDegree, and the relative transaction value, AssetTranRatio, for a sample of 82 asset 
purchase transactions confined to dual-class purchasers. Based on the regression results 
summarized in Table 5, all the signs of the coefficients of variable DualClassDegree are positive. 
The estimated coefficients become insignificant when the three industry controls (IndParticipant, 
IndConcentration and IndLeverage) are measured at the 3- and not 4-digit SIC level.  
The change in the significance of the estimated coefficients of DualClassDegree could be 
due to a problem of using this particular variable as a proxy of the degree of dual class structure 
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when a firm’s share structure includes a class with no voting rights. To illustrate, suppose Firm X 
has 100 Class A shares with 0 voting rights per share and 100 Class B shares with 10 voting 
rights per share, while Firm Y has 100 Class A shares with 1 vote per share and 100 Class B 
shares with 10 votes per share. The values of DualClassDegree for Firm X and Y are 5 and 5.5, 
respectively. It is obvious that Firm X with a lower value of DualClassDegree has a much higher 
degree of dual class structure from a voting-rights perspective than Firm Y. To test the effect of 
this potential problem on our results, we use a subsample where all asset purchasers only have 
share classes with at least one vote per share. 
Based on the regression results reported in Table 6 for this subsample, we observe that all 
the estimated coefficients of DualClassDegree are significantly positive. The control variables 
such as Sequence2 and IndLeverage explain the response variable well, and all the regressions are 
significant. This result illustrates that for dual-class purchasers, a higher degree of dual class 
structure leads to a larger relative value of asset transactions. The response variable will increase 
by 0.732 standard deviation when DualClassDegree increases by one standard deviation in 
column (1). 
We also use an alternative method to examine the variable DualClassDegree as a proxy 
of the degree of dual class structure. We add an interactive term DualClassDegree*VoteDummy 
in equation (2) using the full sample, where VoteDummy is a dummy variable which is 1 if one of 
the share classes has no votes per share and 0 otherwise. Based on untabulated results, we find 
that the estimated coefficients of DualClassDegree are always statistically significant, which is 
consistent with the results in Table 6, while those of the interactive variable are not significant. 
 
7. Relation between relative transaction values and family involvement 
for dual-class purchasers 
Various studies report that family involvement plays an important role in the operations 
of dual-class firms. Thus, in this section, we focus on the relation between relative value of asset 
purchases by dual-class buyers and family participation as shareholders and as members of 




To test whether the relative value of asset purchases depends upon whether the dual-class 
purchaser is family-controlled, value of family ownership, and whether the dual-class purchaser 
has two or more family-related directors, respectively, we examine the sign and significance of 
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 from the following regression based on the assumption that the 
relationships are linear: 





                                    
                                                   
  
 
                                                      
                                
 
(3) 
where all the variables are as previously defined (also see Table 1). 
 
7.2 Empirical results 
Since there are no dual-class purchasers with family ownership between 5% and 10% for 
this test, we can use either threshold to identify family-controlled firms. However, due to the high 
correlation between the FamilyDummy and FamilyOwnership, we examine the separate effects of 
these two variables for the 82 transactions by dual-class buyers. 
Based on Table 7, all estimated coefficients of FamilyDummy are significantly positive, 
and those for DirectorDummy are significantly negative. These results imply that the relative 
value of asset transactions for family-controlled dual-class purchasers is greater than that for 
nonfamily-controlled ones, and that the relative transaction value for dual-class purchasers who 
have two or more family members on the board of directors is smaller than the value for those 
who have less than two family members on the board of directors. This result can be attributed to 
possible contradiction among family members on the board, such as sibling rivalry. 
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Based on Table 8, all of the estimated coefficients of FamilyOwnership are positive and 
statistically significant, and those for DirectorDummy remain significantly negative. This implies 
that a higher family ownership contributes to a bigger relative transaction value, and the value 
will increase by 0.741 standard deviation if family ownership increases by one standard deviation 
in column (1). 
 
8. Conclusion 
We focus first on whether the relative transaction values differ for single- and dual-class 
purchasers. No significant differences are revealed at conventional levels. Taking family 
involvement into account and using 5% and 10% as the threshold for identifying family-
controlled firms, we find that the relative transaction value for a family-controlled dual-class 
purchaser is significantly greater than that for a family-controlled single-class buyer, and that this 
relation does not hold among nonfamily-controlled asset purchasers. These findings demonstrate 
that dual class share structures assist family shareholders in improving their control over 
corporate decision making, such as asset purchases. 
However, when the examination is only of dual-class asset purchasers, the degree of dual 
class share structure has a significantly positive effect on the relative transaction value, which 
suggests that asset purchasers with higher degrees of dual class structures, on average, participate 
in asset transactions with larger relative transaction values. 
We conclude our analyses with an examination of the effects of three aspects of family 
involvement on the relative transaction values for dual-class buyers. We find that the relative 
value of asset transactions for family-controlled dual-class purchasers is significantly larger than 
that for nonfamily-controlled ones, that dual-class purchasers with higher family ownership are 
often engaged in transactions with larger relative values, and that the relative transaction values 
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Table 1. Summary description of variables 
This table lists the definition, calculation method, and data source for each variable. 
Variable Description Source 
AssetTranRatio Value of the asset transaction divided by the purchaser's total assets. SDC Platinum and 
Factiva 
ClassDummy A dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the purchaser is dual-class and 
0 if not. 
SEDAR 
DualClassDegree 
                
                 
         
 
where A, B, C, and D denote the number of Class A, B, C, and D 
common shares respectively, and a, b, c, and d represent the number of 
voting rights for each Class A, B, C, and D common share. This index 
reflects the degree of dual class structure. 
SEDAR 
FamilyDummy A dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the purchaser is family-
controlled and 0 if not. 
SEDAR 
FamilyOwnership The percentage of the total number of outstanding common shares held 
by family shareholders. 
SEDAR 
DirectorDummy A dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the purchaser has 2 or more 
directors who are related family members on its board of directors and 0 
if not. 
SEDAR 
Sequence1 A dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the purchaser traded after a 
sequence of buys and 0 if not. 
– 
Sequence2 Number of buys before this particular transaction. – 
ROA Purchaser’s net income for the last 12 months divided by the 
purchaser’s total assets for the same period. 
SDC Platinum 
EPS Purchaser earnings per share for the last 12 months. SDC Platinum 
StockReturn The percentage change of the closing stock price for the purchaser from 
4 weeks to 1 week prior to the purchase announcement. 
SDC Platinum 
Leverage Purchaser’s total liabilities for the last 12 months divided by the 
purchaser’s total assets for the same period. 
SDC Platinum 
IndParticipant Number of firms which belong to the same industry as the purchaser. WRDS 
IndConcentration                        
        
        
        
        
  
where        denotes market share of the top 5 firms, calculated as its 
sales divided by the sum of the sales of all the firms in the same 
industry as the purchaser. 
WRDS 
IndLeverage Average value of the leverage ratios of all firms in the same industry as 
the purchaser. 
WRDS 
GDPGrowth The percentage change of real GDP compared to the previous year for 
the country in which the purchaser is headquartered. 
World Bank Open 
Data, EIU, IMF, 






Table 2. Summary statistics 
This table presents three panels of descriptive information for the sample of firms. 
 
Table2, Panel A: This panel classifies transactions in both the full sample and the subsample 
based on various criteria. 
Criteria 
Number of transactions in samples of 
1632 transactions 82 transactions 
Listing venue of purchaser 
    
TSX 789 74 
TSX Venture 848 11 
Cross-listed in the U.S. 389 33 
Dummy variable 1 0 1 0 
ClassDummy 82 1550 – – 
FamilyDummy – – 38 44 
DirectorDummy – – 38 44 
Sequence1 644 988 44 38 
 
Table 2, Panel B: This panel reports summary statistics (means, medians, standard deviations, 
and maximum and minimum values) for variables in the full sample of 1,632 asset transactions. 






AssetTranRatio 0.7952 0.0825 6.4698 221.7391 0.0001 1632 
Sequence2 0.8817 0 1.6721 13 0 1632 
ROA -0.2203 -0.0188 0.9427 4.5000 -20.0000 1632 
EPS -0.0641 -0.0160 4.6002 23.7123 -153.6986 1580 
StockReturn 0.0015 -0.0058 0.1880 1.1528 -0.7436 1412 
Leverage 0.3246 0.3175 0.2247 0.9853 0.0061 1512 
IndParticipant2 229.3553 56 257.9173 1054 1 1545 
IndParticipant3 179.0736 38 213.4694 909 1 1290 
IndParticipant4 191.5396 96 180.4213 621 1 858 
IndConcentration2 0.2147 0.1042 0.2121 1.0000 0.0085 1545 
IndConcentration3 0.2333 0.1620 0.2105 1.0000 0.0162 1290 
IndConcentration4 0.2004 0.1460 0.1847 1.0000 0.0162 858 
IndLeverage2 0.3104 0.3409 0.1591 0.8932 0.0064 1506 
IndLeverage3 0.3229 0.3452 0.1593 0.8948 0.0064 1224 
IndLeverage4 0.3986 0.3748 0.1437 0.9701 0.0490 790 




Table 2, Panel C: This panel reports summary statistics (means, medians, standard deviations, 
and maximum and minimum values) for variables in the subsample of 82 asset transactions. 






AssetTranRatio 0.2411 0.0443 0.7594 5.3934 0.0005 82 
DualClassDegree 2.7130 1.1296 3.2072 10.9221 0.0403 82 
FamilyOwnership 0.1306 0.0067 0.1812 0.8127 0 82 
Sequence2 1.6829 1 2.6428 12 0 82 
ROA -0.0471 0.0520 0.5465 0.2576 -4.4857 82 
EPS 1.0502 0.7553 1.3805 4.9925 -2.2890 82 
StockReturn 0.0164 0.0076 0.1019 0.3749 -0.1923 55 
Leverage 0.5078 0.5272 0.1673 0.8750 0.1000 82 
IndParticipant2 230.4568 188 254.0158 976 1 81 
IndParticipant3 93.0141 38 163.7255 828 1 71 
IndParticipant4 44.3538 27 70.2456 377 5 65 
IndConcentration2 0.1033 0.0472 0.1390 1.0000 0.0122 81 
IndConcentration3 0.1511 0.0841 0.1477 1.0000 0.0197 71 
IndConcentration4 0.1896 0.1885 0.1173 0.6881 0.0370 65 
IndLeverage2 0.4446 0.4702 0.1221 0.6285 0.0692 71 
IndLeverage3 0.4323 0.4244 0.1406 0.7144 0.0692 55 
IndLeverage4 0.5110 0.4892 0.1801 0.9658 0.1995 51 




Table 3. This table shows the results of whether the relative transaction values differ for single- and dual-class asset purchasers for the 
full sample of 1,632 asset transactions. 
A full sample of 1632 asset transactions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
ClassDummy 
-0.583 -0.418 -0.397 -0.571 -0.554 0.153 0.144 -0.512 -0.519 0.150 0.141 -0.563 -0.569 




















































-1.009*** -1.007*** -1.009*** -1.013*** -0.277** -0.267** -0.755** -0.754** -0.278** -0.267** -0.755** -0.755** 
 
(-3.94) (-3.93) (-3.60) (-3.61) (-2.40) (-2.32) (-2.41) (-2.41) (-2.41) (-2.32) (-2.41) (-2.41) 
EPS    
-0.006 -0.007 
        
   
(-0.15) (-0.18) 
        
StockReturn    
-0.411 -0.423 
        
   
(-0.4) (-0.42) 
        
Leverage  
0.807 0.795 1.344 1.276 -0.414* -0.424* 2.305* 2.292* -0.418* -0.427* 2.212* 2.202* 
 
(1.08) (1.07) (1.58) (1.51) (-1.69) (-1.73) (1.94) (1.93) (-1.70) (-1.75) (1.86) (1.85) 


















IndConcentration3      
  -0.490 -0.483   -0.589 -0.584 
     
  (-0.32) (-0.31)   (-0.38) (-0.38) 
IndConcentration4      
0.135 0.099   0.132 0.097   
     
(0.37) (0.27)   (0.36) (0.27)   
IndLeverage3      
  -3.134* -3.116*   -3.264* -3.250* 
     
  (-1.69) (-1.68)   (-1.76) (-1.75) 
IndLeverage4      
-0.082 -0.051   -0.087 -0.057   
     
(-0.22) (-0.14)   (-0.24) (-0.16)   
GDPGrowth 
         
1.601 1.479 15.981 16.025 
33 
         
(0.57) (0.53) (1.28) (1.28) 
F Value 0.63 4.22*** 4.23*** 2.75** 2.64** 3.67*** 4.10*** 1.90* 1.90* 3.25*** 3.62*** 1.87* 1.87* 
Adj R-Sq -0.0002 0.0085 0.0085 0.0082 0.0077 0.0241 0.0278 0.0055 0.0055 0.0232 0.0269 0.0061 0.0061 
Observations 1632 1512 1512 1265 1265 759 759 1135 1135 759 759 1135 1135 
Note: The values of the t-statistics are reported in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
          *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. This table reports the results of whether the relative transaction values differ for single- 
and dual-class asset purchasers for the four subsamples based on whether purchasers are family-
controlled or not and whether the threshold used to identify family-controlled firms is 5% or 10%. 
 
Table 4, Panel A: This panel shows the results for the subsample of family-controlled buyers 
based on a 5% threshold. 
A sample of asset transactions by family-controlled purchasers (5% as the threshold) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
ClassDummy 
0.223* 0.528** 0.519** 0.670*** 0.674*** 0.576** 0.569** 0.700*** 0.710*** 






















































-0.389 -0.469 -0.297 -0.333 -0.334 -0.424 -0.251 -0.297 
 
(-0.82) (-1.01) (-0.63) (-0.71) (-0.72) (-0.93) (-0.54) (-0.65) 
IndParticipant4  
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 
 
(-1.53) (-1.47) (-1.29) (-1.27) (-1.73) (-1.66) (-1.52) (-1.49) 
IndConcentration4  
-0.590 -0.522 -0.767 -0.728 -0.671 -0.583 -0.826 -0.771 
 
(-0.87) (-0.78) (-1.13) (-1.08) (-1.01) (-0.89) (-1.24) (-1.17) 
IndLeverage4  
-1.705** -1.579** -1.410** -1.352* -1.900*** -1.772*** -1.635** -1.558** 
 
(-2.59) (-2.39) (-2.02) (-1.97) (-2.90) (-2.69) (-2.35) (-2.29) 
GDPGrowth      
-9.473* -9.130* -9.725** -9.561* 
     
(-1.93) (-1.85) (-2.00) (-1.97) 
F Value 3.74* 2.86** 2.81** 2.92*** 2.90*** 3.05*** 2.96*** 3.16*** 3.11*** 
Adj R-Sq 0.0182 0.1341 0.1311 0.1381 0.1365 0.1636 0.1574 0.1705 0.1675 
Observations 149 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 
Note: The values of the t-statistics are reported in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
          *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 4, Panel B: This panel shows the results for the subsample of family-controlled buyers 
based on a 10% threshold. 
A sample of asset transactions by family-controlled purchasers (10% as the threshold) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ClassDummy 
0.228* 0.521** 0.507** 0.582** 0.569** 




















0.458 0.458 0.348 0.341 
 
(1.15) (1.14) (0.88) (0.85) 
Leverage  
-0.391 -0.467 -0.322 -0.407 
 
(-0.79) (-0.96) (-0.66) (-0.85) 
IndParticipant4  
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001* 
 
(-1.5) (-1.49) (-1.68)  (-1.67) 
IndConcentration4  
-0.631 -0.583 -0.768 -0.705 
 
(-0.81) (-0.75) (-1) (-0.92) 
IndLeverage4  
-1.810** -1.687** -2.031*** -1.910*** 
 
(-2.57) (-2.39) (-2.89) (-2.70) 
GDPGrowth    
-9.584* -9.262* 
   
(-1.85) (-1.77) 
F Value 3.51* 2.69** 2.65** 2.86*** 2.78*** 
Adj R-Sq 0.0184 0.1319 0.1291 0.1604 0.1546 
Observations 135 79 79 79 79 
Note: The values of the t-statistics are reported in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
          *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
36 
Table 4, Panel C: This panel shows the results for the subsample of nonfamily-controlled buyers 
based on a 5% threshold. 
A sample of asset transactions by nonfamily-controlled purchasers (5% as the threshold) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
ClassDummy 
-0.740 -0.145 -0.152 -0.703 -0.710 -0.148 -0.154 -0.751 -0.757 




































-0.314** -0.304** -0.763** -0.763** -0.315*** -0.305** -0.764** -0.764** 
 
(-2.58) (-2.50) (-2.30) (-2.30) (-2.59) (-2.51) (-2.31) (-2.31) 
Leverage  
-0.452* -0.457* 2.569* 2.563* -0.458* -0.461* 2.471* 2.466* 
 
(-1.67) (-1.69) (1.96) (1.95) (-1.69) (-1.70) (1.88) (1.88) 
IndParticipant3  
  -0.001 -0.001   -0.001 -0.001 
 
  (-0.54) (-0.52)   (-0.68) (-0.66) 
IndParticipant4  
0.001*** 0.001***   0.001*** 0.001***   
 
(2.96) (2.98)   (2.90) (2.92)   
IndConcentration3  
  -0.423 -0.416   -0.564 -0.560 
 
  (-0.25) (-0.25)   (-0.33) (-0.33) 
IndConcentration4  
0.249 0.215   0.241 0.208   
 
(0.62) (0.54)   (0.6) (0.52)   
IndLeverage3  
  -3.293 -3.282   -3.476* -3.468* 
 
  (-1.62) (-1.61)   (-1.71) (-1.70) 
IndLeverage4  
0.137 0.155   0.122 0.141   
 
(0.34) (0.39)   (0.3) (0.35)   
GDPGrowth      
2.509 2.316 18.528 18.551 
     
(0.81) (0.75) (1.35) (1.36) 
F Value 0.51 3.88*** 4.23*** 1.78* 1.78* 3.47*** 3.77*** 1.79* 1.79* 
Adj R-Sq -0.0003 0.0291 0.0325 0.0053 0.0053 0.0286 0.0318 0.0061 0.0061 
Observations 1482 674 674 1033 1033 674 674 1033 1033 
Note: The values of the t-statistics are reported in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
          *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
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Table 4, Panel D: This panel shows the results for the subsample of nonfamily-controlled buyers 
based on a 10% threshold. 
A sample of asset transactions by nonfamily-controlled purchasers (10% as the threshold) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
ClassDummy 
-0.747 -0.143 -0.150 -0.693 -0.700 -0.146 -0.153 -0.737 -0.742 




































-0.315*** -0.305** -0.757** -0.757** -0.317*** -0.307** -0.758** -0.758** 
 
(-2.60) (-2.52) (-2.31) (-2.30) (-2.61) (-2.53) (-2.31) (-2.31) 
Leverage  
-0.449* -0.454* 2.521* 2.514* -0.454* -0.458* 2.423* 2.417* 
 
(-1.66) (-1.69) (1.94) (1.94) (-1.68) (-1.70) (1.86) (1.86) 
IndParticipant3  
  -0.001 -0.001   -0.001 -0.001 
 
  (-0.55) (-0.53)   (-0.68) (-0.67) 
IndParticipant4  
0.001*** 0.001***   0.001*** 0.001***   
 
(2.97) (2.98)   (2.91) (2.92)   
IndConcentration3  
  -0.423 -0.416   -0.556 -0.551 
 
  (-0.26) (-0.25)   (-0.33) (-0.33) 
IndConcentration4  
0.237 0.202   0.230 0.196   
 
(0.6) (0.51)   (0.58) (0.5)   
IndLeverage3  
  -3.251 -3.241   -3.435* -3.427* 
 
  (-1.63) (-1.62)   (-1.71) (-1.71) 
IndLeverage4  
0.132 0.150   0.118 0.136   
 
(0.33) (0.38)   (0.3) (0.34)   
GDPGrowth      
2.440 2.246 18.163 18.189 
     
(0.79) (0.73) (1.34) (1.34) 
F Value 0.52 3.91*** 4.26*** 1.79* 1.79* 3.50*** 3.79*** 1.79* 1.79* 
Adj R-Sq -0.0003 0.0291 0.0325 0.0052 0.0052 0.0286 0.0318 0.0060 0.0060 
Observations 1497 680 680 1045 1045 680 680 1045 1045 
Note: The values of the t-statistics are reported in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
          *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
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Table 5. This table presents the results when examining the association between the degree of the 
dual class structure and the relative transaction value for a sample of 82 asset purchase 
transactions confined to dual-class purchasers. 
A sample of 82 asset transactions by dual-class purchasers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DualClassDegree 
0.060** 0.115** 0.119*** 0.040 0.046 0.133*** 0.147*** 0.050 
































-0.230 -0.228 -0.181 -0.186 -0.305 -0.325 -0.239 
 
(-1.17) (-1.17) (-0.91) (-0.94) (-1.52) (-1.64) (-1.2) 
Leverage  
-0.480 -0.470 -0.579 -0.614 -0.636 -0.661 -0.501 
 
(-0.57) (-0.56) (-0.67) (-0.71) (-0.75) (-0.8) (-0.59) 
IndParticipant3  
  -0.001* -0.001*   -0.001* 
 
  (-1.84) (-1.84)   (-1.80) 
IndParticipant4  
-0.002 -0.002   -0.003 -0.003*  
 
(-1.15) (-1.18)   (-1.51) (-1.68)  
IndConcentration3  
  -3.666* -3.550*   -4.259** 
 
  (-2.01) (-1.94)   (-2.32) 
IndConcentration4  
0.124 0.172   -0.065 -0.022  
 
(0.11) (0.15)   (-0.06) (-0.02)  
IndLeverage3  
  -2.940** -2.741**   -3.329*** 
 
  (-2.44) (-2.15)   (-2.75) 
IndLeverage4  
-2.450*** -2.342***   -2.488*** -2.274***  
 
(-3.10) (-2.90)   (-3.18) (-2.89)  
GDPGrowth      
-10.167 -13.244* -10.743 
     
(-1.44) (-1.79) (-1.56) 
F Value 5.54** 2.89** 2.97** 2.54** 2.58** 2.85** 3.13*** 2.59** 
Adj R-Sq 0.0531 0.2093 0.2158 0.1663 0.1701 0.2286 0.2540 0.1908 
Observations 82 51 51 55 55 51 51 55 
Note: The values of the t-statistics are reported in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
          *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
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Table 6. This table presents the results of examining the association between the degree of the dual class structure and the relative 
transaction value when excluding purchasers who have certain shares with no votes per share. 
A sample of asset transactions by dual-class purchasers (Exclude purchasers who have certain shares with no votes per share) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
DualClassDegree 
0.294*** 0.326*** 0.248*** 0.274*** 0.222*** 0.240*** 0.294*** 0.338*** 0.259*** 0.308*** 0.238*** 0.280*** 



















































-0.459* -0.471* -0.295 -0.311 -0.325 -0.365 -0.516* -0.581** -0.416 -0.490** -0.448 -0.538** 
(-1.84) (-1.95) (-1.18) (-1.28) (-1.25) (-1.4) (-1.90) (-2.24) (-1.62) (-2.04) (-1.7) (-2.07) 
Leverage 
-2.047 -1.803 -1.732 -1.466 -1.817 -1.735 -2.164 -2.026 -1.650 -1.310 -1.675 -1.547 
(-1.63) (-1.51) (-1.5) (-1.31) (-1.45) (-1.38) (-1.68) (-1.68) (-1.45) (-1.24) (-1.37) (-1.3) 
IndParticipant2   
0.001 0.001 





    
(1.02) (1.39) 
  
IndParticipant3     
-0.001 -0.001 
    
0.001 0.001 
    
(-0.59) (-0.62) 




    
-0.002 -0.002 
    
(-0.77) (-0.75) 
    
(-0.72) (-0.68) 
    
IndLeverage2   
-4.198** -3.892** 





    
(-2.35) (-2.24) 
  
IndLeverage3     
-3.875** -3.009* 
    
-4.045** -3.034* 
    
(-2.45) (-1.92) 




    
-2.789** -2.395** 
    
(-3.00) (-2.92) 
    
(-2.59) (-2.30) 
    
GDPGrowth       
-10.406 -19.732 -23.951 -34.835** -26.793 -35.095* 
      
(-0.59) (-1.14) (-1.55) (-2.32) (-1.59) (-2.05) 
F Value 3.41** 3.93*** 2.92** 3.42*** 2.87** 2.86** 2.90** 3.59*** 2.95** 4.09*** 2.96** 3.35** 
Adj R-Sq 0.3256 0.3692 0.2280 0.2715 0.2539 0.2532 0.3068 0.3770 0.2594 0.3568 0.2935 0.3324 
Observations 31 31 40 40 34 34 31 31 40 40 34 34 
Note: The values of the t-statistics are reported in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
          *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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Table 7. This table reveals the results of regressing FamilyDummy and DirectorDummy on 
relative transaction values for a sample of 82 asset purchase transactions confined to dual-class 
purchasers. 
A sample of 82 asset transactions by dual-class purchasers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FamilyDummy 
0.916*** 0.819*** 0.817** 0.865*** 0.853*** 
(2.75) (2.70) (2.68) (2.91) (2.87) 
DirectorDummy 
-0.633* -0.596* -0.590* -0.693** -0.672** 



















-0.188 -0.197 -0.194 -0.239 -0.236 
(-0.99) (-1.04) (-1.02) (-1.28) (-1.27) 
Leverage  
-0.410 -0.421 -0.142 -0.146 
 
(-0.48) (-0.49) (-0.17) (-0.17) 
IndParticipant3 
 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.39) (-1.39) (-1.37) (-1.37) 
IndParticipant4 
-0.001     
(-0.54)     
IndConcentration3 
 -2.767* -2.804* -3.581** -3.662** 
 (-1.68) (-1.71) (-2.15) (-2.20) 
IndConcentration4 
-0.285     
(-0.26)     
IndLeverage3 
 -2.805*** -2.869*** -3.375*** -3.381*** 
 (-2.76) (-2.78) (-3.26) (-3.25) 
IndLeverage4 
-1.876**     
(-2.44)     
GDPGrowth    
-12.022* -12.228* 
   
(-1.87) (-1.86) 
F Value 2.96** 3.38*** 3.37*** 3.55*** 3.54*** 
Adj R-Sq 0.2150 0.2607 0.2597 0.2986 0.2973 
Observations 51 55 55 55 55 
Note: The values of the t-statistics are reported in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
          *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 8. This table reports the results of regressing FamilyOwnership and DirectorDummy on the 
relative transaction values for a sample of 82 asset purchase transactions confined to dual-class 
purchasers. 
A sample of 82 asset transactions by dual-class purchasers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
FamilyOwnership 
3.107*** 3.234*** 3.587*** 3.591*** 3.187*** 3.270*** 3.267*** 
(8.58) (8.94) (6.93) (6.97) (8.44) (6.41) (6.43) 
DirectorDummy 
-0.421*** -0.489*** -0.691*** -0.677*** -0.371** -0.597*** -0.572** 
(-3.03) (-3.46) (-2.92) (-2.88) (-2.18) (-2.76) (-2.67) 
Sequence1 

















-0.245** -0.253** -0.269* -0.269* -0.221* -0.251* -0.250* 




-0.060 0.234 0.231 
(-0.78) (-0.25) 
  










IndParticipant3      
0.001 0.001 
     
(-0.24) (-0.22) 
IndParticipant4   
0.001 -0.001 
   
  
(-0.33) (-0.44) 
   
IndConcentration2 
0.384 0.425   
   
(0.72) (0.81)   
   
IndConcentration3 
  
   
-0.900 -1.009 
  
   
(-0.64) (-0.72) 








IndLeverage2   
  -0.841 
  
  
  (-1.24) 
  
IndLeverage3     
 -1.360 -1.306 
    
 (-1.51) (-1.45) 









-7.343* -7.967 -8.994* -6.656 -9.797* -10.523** 
 
(-1.90) (-1.54) (-1.68) (-1.57) (-1.94) (-2.04) 
F Value 11.76*** 11.11*** 9.01*** 9.13*** 10.27*** 8.77*** 8.85*** 
Adj R-Sq 0.4849 0.5027 0.5618 0.5653 0.5144 0.5643 0.5669 
Observations 81 81 51 51 71 55 55 
Note: The values of the t-statistics are reported in the parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  
         *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
